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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps the most important and commonly cited case by courts and 
legal commentators that addresses an employer’s duty to accommodate an 
employee’s religious beliefs where the employer raises safety issues is the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.1  Pursuant to 
what it believed were requirements of California's Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (Cal/OSHA), Chevron adopted a policy requiring all machinists 
to shave off any facial hair interfering with the ability to achieve a gas-tight 
face seal with a respirator.2  When Bhatia, a machinist and a member of the 
Sikh religion, refused to shave, he was demoted.3
 
 * University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2010; University of Michigan, B.S. 
2007.  The author wishes to thank Professor Benjamin W. Wolkinson, Michigan State 
University, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, for his substantial support and 
guidance. 
  Finding that Chevron’s 
safety concerns were legitimate, the court ruled that accommodating 
Bhatia’s request to maintain his bearded appearance would subject the 
 1. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984); see, e.g., Cloutier v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bhatia) (“Such 
regulations are often justified with regard to safety concerns.”); 3 LEX K. LARSON, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 56.10[1] (2d ed. 2008) (“The leading example of this 
principle, as it pertains to Title VII, is . . . Bhatia v. Chevron USA.”). 
 2. Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1383. 
 3. Id. 
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company to undue hardship, and consequently it dismissed his claim of 
religious discrimination.4
This comment represents a historical and legal critique of this widely 
accepted decision.  The comment is divided into the following sections.  
First, it will provide an overview of the minority religious groups within 
our society who are negatively affected by a grooming policy prohibiting 
beards at the workplace.  Second, it will briefly identify the nature of an 
employer’s duty to accommodate under Title VII and critically evaluate the 
test of undue hardship liquidating that obligation that the Supreme Court 
established in its seminal decision, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.
 
5  
Third, based on a review of documents on record with the California 
Division of Occupational Safety and Health,6 the agency that reviewed 
Bhatia’s situation, it will argue that Chevron would not have been in breach 
of any OSHA requirement had it accommodated Bhatia.  Fourth, it will 
present an alternative legal model of business necessity, first promulgated 
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,7
II. BACKGROUND 
 that merits 
application in religious accommodation cases in order to afford equal 
employment opportunity to members of our society whose religious beliefs 
are less widely spread or known.  Fifth, it will critically evaluate other no-
beard cases to illustrate the current judicial predisposition to ignore the 
serious disparate impact that a failure to accommodate will have on many 
religious groups, thereby making diversity in the workplace a difficult goal 
to realize.  Finally, against the background of Bhatia and other cases, it will 
propose legislative action to ensure that the religious beliefs of workers will 
not unfairly restrict their job opportunities. 
A. Why a Conflict Exists 
The overwhelming majority of Americans identify themselves as 
adherents of Christianity, with 78.4 percent of adults belonging to some 
Christian group, primarily Catholic or Protestant.8
 
 4. Id. at 1384. 
  Yet our nation’s 
population also consists of adherents of other faiths followed more 
predominantly in other parts of the world, including those practicing 
 5. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 6. The documents referred to are actual case records that California OSHA compiled 
regarding Bhatia’s request for accommodation.  The author wishes to thank Michael 
Horowitz, Senior Industrial Hygienist at California OSHA, for providing these documents. 
 7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 8. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY, 
5 (Feb. 2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports. 
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Judaism (1.7%), Islam (0.6%), Buddhism (0.7%), and Sikhism (0.1%).9  
While these religious groups compose only a relatively small percentage of 
the population, their presence is increasing, as the number of individuals 
practicing Islam, Buddhism, and Sikhism has doubled between 1990 and 
2001.10
As the United States becomes more ethnically and religiously diverse, 
conflicts may arise between an employee’s adherence to his faith and 
compliance with an organization’s business policies and practices.  One 
such source of conflict may be a firm’s grooming policies.  A recent report 
by the Society for Human Resource Management noted that eighty-nine 
percent of organizations have some type of policy restricting an employee’s 
personal appearance.
 
11  Of these, twenty-nine percent may have restrictions 
on facial hair including an outright ban on the wearing of beards.12  
Employers typically provide a variety of reasons for their grooming 
policies, including safety,13 concerns over customer preferences and public 
image,14 and a desire to maintain uniformity of employee-appearance to 
promote discipline and morale.15
Policies banning the wearing of beards at the work site may have a 
severe impact on the employment of Muslim, Sikh, and Jewish workers and 
job applicants.  Within Islam, some religious Muslims consider shaving 
one’s beard to be a violation of the Prophet’s command.  Thus some 
Islamic scholars maintain that the wearing of a beard complies with 
Mohammad’s command to wear a beard as a sign of separation from 
 
 
 9. Id. at 12, 21; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2004-2005, 55 available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf. 
 10. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 55. 
 11. SHRM Research PowerPoint, Does your organization have a policy addressing 
employee personal appearance? - SHRM Poll, at 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/gemployeepersonalappearanc
e.aspx. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that accommodating a worker’s religious beliefs that prevented him from shaving 
facial hair would have caused the employer undue hardship). 
 14. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005) (holding that it would cause an undue hardship for Costco to 
modify its no-facial-jewelry policy as a reasonable accommodation for an employee who 
claimed membership in the Church of Body Modification because the exemption would 
adversely affect the employer’s public image that it wanted to cultivate).  But see EEOC v. 
Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the employer did not 
prove there was a business necessity for his employee no-beard policy). 
 15. See, e.g., Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1993) (denying plaintiff’s 
request for an injunction against an employer’s “no moustache” policy and accepting 
defendant’s argument that consistency in appearance would help foster a shared pride and 
cohesiveness between the employees). 
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adherents of other religions.16
Within all major facets of Judaism—Reform, Conservative, and 
Orthodox—there is no broad general religious requirement to maintain a 
beard.  However, ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic Jews typically wear beards 
and payot (side curls) as an inherent requirement of Jewish tradition.
 
17  
Additionally, there is a custom among Orthodox Jews of not shaving 
during the first thirty days of mourning after the passing of an immediate 
family member.18  Some Orthodox Jewish men also may wear beards 
during the seven weeks between Passover and the holiday of Shavuot as a 
symbol of collective Jewish mourning.19
For Sikhs, the wearing of a beard is a cardinal element of their faith, 
as “kes, unshorn hair, is an article of faith and an inviolable vow.”
 
20  Unlike 
Judaism and Islam that may recognize different levels of practice and 
observance, the rejection of the physical principles of Sikhism, which 
include the wearing of a turban and unshorn hair, signifies a repudiation of 
the faith.21
B. Title VII and the Duty of Accommodation 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that: 
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- 
 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
 
 16. THOMAS P. HUGHES, DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 40 (Lahore, 1964) available at 
http://www.answering-islam.org/Books/Hughes/index.htm; see also Potter v. District of 
Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting the plaintiff’s declaration that he 
was wearing a beard as an expression of his religious Islamic faith). 
 17. Beard and Shaving, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, 235-36 (Michael Berenbaum & 
Fred Skolnik eds., Keter Publishing House 2d ed. 2007). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Kesadhari, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SIKHISM 465-66 (Harbans Singh ed., 
Punjabi University, 1st ed. 1996) (“All codes and manuals defining Sikh conduct are 
unanimous in saying that uncut hair is obligatory for every Sikh. . . . Guru Gobind Singh 
[was quoted saying]: ‘My Sikh shall not use the razor. . . . [T]he use of [a] razor or shaving 
the chin shall be as sinful as incest.’”); see also EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp 
86, 88 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (“This requirement of wearing facial hair, known as Kes or Kesha, is 
an essential tenet of Sikhism.”); Five Symbols, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SIKHISM 37-38 
(Harbans Singh ed., Punjabi University, 1st ed. 1996) (“Of these five symbols (the Five 
K’s), primacy unquestionably belongs to the kes.”). 
 21. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
Sikh religion proscribes the cutting or shaving of any body hair.”). 
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sex, or national origin; or 
 
(2) to limit . . . his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.22
Religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well 
as belief.”
 
23  Under Title VII, an employer is required to reasonably 
accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs, practices, or behavior, 
unless the accommodation will impose an “undue hardship [on] the 
conduct of the employer's business.”24  There is a well-established two-part 
analysis for religious discrimination claims.25  First, the employee must 
establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination.26  Second, if the 
employee does so, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it had 
negotiated with the employee in a good faith effort to reasonably 
accommodate the employee’s religious observance.27  In situations where 
the negotiations do not result in a solution that would eliminate the 
employee’s religious conflict, the employer must demonstrate that 
accommodating the employee would cause an undue hardship.28  Only if 
the employer can prove that no accommodation would be possible without 
imposing on itself undue hardship, is the employer excused from making 
the necessary changes to accommodate the employee’s religious 
practices.29
 On its face, the statute does not define “reasonable accommodation” 
 
 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2009). 
 23. Id. at § 2000e(j). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)) (explaining the two-part 
analysis of Title VII religious discrimination claims). 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 1467 (describing the plaintiff’s burden in religious discrimination 
suits).  In order for the employee to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, 
he must satisfy a three-part test.  EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 
n.5 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).  The employee must establish the 
following elements:  “(1) [that] he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which 
conflicted with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of the belief and conflict; 
and (3) the employer threatened him or subjected him to discriminatory treatment . . . 
because of his inability to fulfill the job requirements.”  Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 
1433, 1438 (1993). 
 27. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467 (describing the defendant’s burden at 
trial). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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or “undue hardship.”30  Therefore, the exact obligation of an employer to 
his employee must be analyzed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.31
1.  Reasonable Accommodation 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to define “reasonable accommodation,” 
but it has held that an employer satisfies its duty of accommodation by 
offering a religious employee a reasonable accommodation, and it is not 
obligated to choose the reasonable accommodation most favored by the 
employee.32  While, “an accommodation is reasonable as a matter of law if 
it eliminates a religious conflict,”33 the law does not provide that in order to 
be reasonable the accommodation “must eliminate any religious conflict.”34  
The duty to accommodate should foster “bilateral cooperation” between 
employers and employees.35  Accordingly, in a recent Title VII religious 
discrimination case, the Eighth Circuit held that whether an employer has 
reasonably accommodated an employee’s religious observance or practice 
depends on the sum of the circumstances.36
 
 30. See Trans World Airlines Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977) (“[T]he 
employer’s statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation . . . short of incurring an 
undue hardship, is clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been spelled out by 
Congress or by EEOC guidelines.”). 
  Keeping in mind that while the 
statutory burden to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs falls on 
 31. See Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Beadle v. 
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1128 (1995)) (“[P]recise reach of the employer’s obligation to its employee is unclear 
under the statute and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 32. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986); see also id. at 69 n.6 
(finding an EEOC guideline that required the employer to choose the accommodation that 
least disadvantages the employee to be inconsistent with Title VII); Brener v. Diagnostic 
Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A reasonable accommodation need not be 
on the employee's terms only.”). 
 33. Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 71). 
 34. Id. at 1031 (emphasis in original).  In Sturgill, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
district court improperly instructed the jury that under Title VII an employer was obligated 
to eliminate the religious conflict; ultimately, however, the court held that the error in jury 
instructions was not a reversible error.  Id. at 1033. 
 35. See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69 (quoting Brener, 671 F.2d at 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)) 
(“[B]ilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the 
needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business.”); R. Ryan 
Younger, Recent Developments, 61 ARK. L. REV. 187, 191 (“[W]hereby the employer makes 
a serious effort to accommodate sincere religious beliefs and the employee likewise 
cooperates in the effort for accommodation.”). 
 36. See Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1030 (“What is reasonable depends on the totality of the 
circumstances and therefore might, or might not, require elimination of a particular, fact-
specific conflict.”). 
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the employer, the employee also has a good faith duty to work with the 
employer and to accept the employer’s accommodation if it is reasonable 
and does not compromise the employee’s religious practices.37
2.   Undue Hardship 
 
In Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, the Supreme Court 
established that any accommodation will be considered an “undue 
hardship” if it causes more than a “de minimis” cost to the employer.38  
Significantly, the Court did not define the term “de minimis,” which 
suggests that anything more than a minimal economic cost loss would 
constitute undue hardship.  Within this framework, the Court in Hardison 
ruled that replacing Hardison, who was unable to work Saturdays due to his 
religious observance, would constitute undue hardship, because replacing 
him with his supervisor would result in a loss of efficiency.39  Additionally, 
the Court noted that bringing in an additional worker not regularly assigned 
to the Saturday shift to perform Hardison’s work would constitute undue 
hardship if it required paying premium wages to the substitute worker.40
Since Hardison, subsequent courts have held that de minimis cost 
“entails not only monetary concerns, but also the employer’s burden in 
conducting its business.”
 
41  Additionally, according to the Tenth Circuit, 
“[t]he cost of hiring an additional worker or the loss of production that 
results from not replacing a worker who is unavailable due to a religious 
conflict can amount to undue hardship.”42  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit 
has stated that any hardship asserted by an employer “must be real rather 
than speculative,43 merely conceivable or hypothetical.”44
 
 37. Brener, 671 F.2d at 146; see also id. at 146 n.3 (“Of course, an employee is not 
required to modify his religious beliefs, only to attempt to satisfy them within the 
procedures offered by the employer.”). 
  Moreover, “[a]n 
 38. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To require 
[an employer] to bear more than a de minimis cost . . . is an undue hardship.”). 
 39. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 (disagreeing with the Court of Appeals). 
 40. Id. at 68-69.  But see id. at 76 (allowing Hardison to work four days a week and 
replacing him with a supervisor or co-worker would not have amounted to undue hardship 
according to the Court of Appeals). 
 41. Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 
1152 (1995); see also Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 134 (citing United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 
F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1990)) (“This calculus applies both to economic costs . . . and to non-
economic costs, such as compromising the integrity of a seniority system.”). 
 42. Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994); see also 
Brener, 671 F.2d at 144 (“The effect of Brener's absence from work, the court found, was a 
decrease in efficiency and an increase in the burden on other pharmacists.”). 
 43. Brown, 61 F.3d at 655 (citing Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993)). 
 44. Id. (citing Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981), 
WOLKINSONFINALIZED_SEVEN_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1192 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
employer stands on weak grounds when advancing hypothetical hardships 
in a factual vacuum.”45  The Ninth Circuit has clarified that an “[u]ndue 
hardship cannot be prove[n] by assumptions nor by opinions based on 
hypothetical facts,”46 and that an employer must show more than “proof of 
some fellow-worker’s grumbling . . . [and an] actual imposition on co-
workers or disruption of the work routine.”47  Finally, the First Circuit has 
declared that an employer does not have to actually attempt an 
accommodation in order to prove an undue hardship.48
C.  Critique of the Utilization of the De Minimis Standard 
 
The de minimis standard essentially emasculates the duty to 
accommodate because of the low threshold of cost the employer potentially 
would have to bear to justify a refusal to accommodate.49  For example, 
under current de minimis jurisprudence, an organization could dismiss an 
employee for failing to work on a specific assignment or shift, regardless of 
the infrequency of the assignment and the firm’s economic capacity to find 
and pay a replacement if the needed work had to be performed by other 
employees at a higher rate of pay.50  The Supreme Court criticized 
Marshall’s dissent in Hardison for ignoring the likelihood that a large 
company, like TWA, could have many employees whose religious 
observances might prohibit them from working Saturdays or Sundays.51
 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981)). 
  
However, the Supreme Court cited no evidence that among TWA’s 
workforce there were other Sabbath observers like Hardison, and 
consequently the Court negated the company’s duty to accommodate on the 
basis of a speculative concern.  Moreover, the majority seemingly ignored 
the reality that if a large company, such as TWA, has many religious 
employees, some who cannot work on Saturdays and some who cannot 
work on Sundays, coordinating work schedules in order to accommodate 
the different religious beliefs should be feasible without imposing an undue 
 45. Id. (citing Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
 46. Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). 
 47. Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1072 (1979). 
 48. Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 135 (quoting Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 
515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975)). 
 49. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 92 n.6 (1977) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (questioning whether as a matter of law “undue hardship” could even be 
interpreted under plain English as meaning “more than a de minimis cost”). 
 50. Id. at 68-69; see also supra II.B.2. (discussing Hardison and subsequent appellate 
court decisions). 
 51. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85 n.15. 
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burden on the employer.52
III. BHATIA 
  By establishing the weak evidentiary standard 
of de minimis for proving undue hardship, the Supreme Court set the stage 
for parallel decisions at the appellate and district court levels in which 
courts have essentially refused to accommodate religious employees on the 
basis of speculative considerations. 
A.  Factual Background 
In 1982, Chevron adopted a new safety policy in order to comply with 
already existing Cal/OSHA’s General Industry Safety Orders title 8, 
section 5144.53  Chevron’s respirator policy required all of its employees 
who were potentially exposed to toxic gases to shave all facial hair, so that 
they would have a gas-tight seal when wearing a respirator.54  Under its 
new policy, Chevron included all machinists as employees who potentially 
could be exposed to toxic gases, even those who were not actually required 
to wear respirators while working.55  Machinists at Chevron had a wide 
range of duties.  Some machinists did field work that involved real 
potential exposure to toxic gases and other hazardous substances.56  In 
addition, certain machinists were part of a labor pool that was used in 
emergency situations to fight fires, contain toxic gases, or rescue others.57  
Because the company’s assignment of machinists to jobs involving 
potential exposure to toxic chemicals was unpredictable, all machinists had 
to be able to wear respirators.58  As a result, all machinists were compelled 
to be clean-shaven to achieve a gas-tight seal.59  As a result of the new 
policy, Chevron fired three employees who refused to comply and shave.60
Complainant, Manjit Singh Bhatia, had been a machinist at Chevron 
for several years before it adopted its new safety policy.
 
61
 
 52. See id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he likelihood of accommodation 
being costly would diminish, since trades would be more feasible.”). 
  Upon receiving 
the memorandum of the policy change, Bhatia informed the defendant that 
 53. Bhatia v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984).  The most 
pertinent words of the statute for our discussion are:  “[r]espirators [when needed to be 
worn] . . .  shall not be worn when conditions prevent a good gas-tight face seal.”  CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 5144(c) (1982). 
 54. Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1383. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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he would not be able to comply because as a religious Sikh he was 
forbidden from cutting or shaving any hair.62  Afterwards, the company 
processed an application to transfer Bhatia to a new position that would not 
require him to wear a respirator, but suspended him without pay until it was 
able to find such a position.63  Concurrently, to safeguard his employment, 
Bhatia approached the Board of Executives of the Sikh Center of the San 
Francisco Bay Area and requested a religious exemption to allow him to 
shave his beard.64  The Board refused his request because “facial hair . . . is 
most essential for a Sikh under Sikh and Khalsa Code.”65  After being 
suspended without pay for six weeks, Bhatia was informed that Chevron 
could not find a position that paid as much as a machinist but that did not 
require a respirator, and that the company would look for a lower paying 
position.66  The employer then offered Bhatia three clerical positions, 
which he refused.67  Bhatia asked the employer for an exemption from its 
new policy, because during his three years as a machinist he never was 
required to wear a respirator.68  Chevron refused and instead offered Bhatia 
a job as a janitor, a position that paid seventeen percent less than Bhatia’s 
machinist position.69  Eventually Bhatia accepted the janitorial job offer.70
B.  The Court’s Decision 
 
Bhatia sued Chevron under Title VII for discriminating against him 
because of his religious beliefs.71  After both parties filed for summary 
judgment, the district court awarded summary judgment to the defendant.72  
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the 
defendant.73  The court held that Bhatia had satisfactorily proven his prima 
facie case of religious discrimination.74
 
 62. Id. 
  It indicated that:  1) the plaintiff 
had a bona fide belief that shaving his beard would be in violation of his 
Sikh faith; 2) he had informed Chevron of his religious belief and practice; 
 63. Id. 
 64. Letter from R.S. Dhalimal, Sec’y, Exec. Comm. of the Sikh Ctr. of the San 
Francisco Bay Area (May 23, 1982) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Business Law). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1383. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1382-83. 
 72. Id. at 1383. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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and 3) as a result of this belief, Chevron removed him from his position.75  
Nevertheless, the court noted that Chevron had sustained its burden of 
establishing that it made a good faith effort to accommodate Bhatia’s 
religious beliefs.76  In describing the company’s good faith efforts to 
accommodate Bhatia, the court emphasized that Chevron did not fire 
Bhatia, but rather just suspended him without pay.77  In addition, the court 
underscored how Chevron had offered Bhatia four different replacement 
positions (albeit all lower-paying than his job as a machinist), and that the 
employer promised to re-instate Bhatia as a machinist if a new respirator 
were developed that could safely be worn with a beard.78
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that Chevron had fulfilled its duty 
of accommodation because any further accommodation would have 
resulted in more than a de minimis cost on either the company or Bhatia’s 
co-workers.
 
79  The court provided two explanations for why further 
accommodation would have imposed on Chevron an undue hardship.80  
First, the court accepted Chevron’s argument that if Bhatia were granted an 
exemption from use of an airtight respirator while placed in a machinist 
position exposing him to toxic gases, the company would risk liability for 
violating a Cal/OSHA safety standard.81  In the alternative, if the company 
were to arrange for Bhatia to retain his job as a machinist and allow his 
supervisors to exempt him from assignments that involved potential 
exposure to toxic gases, the company’s burden would be more than de 
minimis because 1) Chevron would have been required to redo its entire 
system of work assignments,82 and 2) Bhatia’s co-workers would have been 
forced to “assume his share of potentially hazardous work.”83
 
 75. Id. 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. (contrasting Bhatia’s situation with that of his co-workers, who were 
terminated after refusing to shave). 
 78. Id.  The court disagreed with Bhatia’s argument that these were insufficient to 
constitute reasonable accommodation simply because the company refused to allow him to 
maintain his position as a machinist by exempting him from its no-beard policy.  Id. 
 79. See id. at 1383 (“[T]o the extent that [Chevron’s] efforts [of accommodation] were 
unsuccessful, further accommodation would have caused it undue hardship.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1384. 
 82. See id. (describing how the company would have had to change its current, 
unpredictable system to include predictions about whether an assignment would involve 
potential exposure to toxins). 
 83. Id.; see also Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (explaining that an employer is not required to 
accommodate a religious employee if the accommodation would constitute preferential 
treatment over other employees). 
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C.  Analysis of Bhatia:  Why the Court Got it Wrong 
Significantly, other courts often cite Bhatia as a precedent for an 
employer’s right not to accommodate because of safety concerns,84 or 
because of the need to comply with a state or federal law or regulation, 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act.85
It is the policy of the Richmond Refinery to comply with all laws 
and regulations affecting our business.  Cal/OSHA regulation 
5144 states that employees may not wear respiratory protection 
when conditions prevent a good gastight seal. . . . 
  However, a close 
inspection of Cal/OSHA’s investigation and review of Bhatia’s situation 
reveals that Chevron’s respiratory protection policy was overly broad and 
that Bhatia’s ultimate removal as a machinist was not necessary.  
Chevron’s bulletin to all of its employees on May 10, 1982 stated: 
 
After an extensive review of our obligation under Cal/OSHA 
regulation, Richmond Refinery has established Monday 24, 1982 
as the effective date for compliance.  Beginning on that date, 
Chevron employees . . . who may be required to wear a 
respiratory protection either in their normal duties or under 
emergency conditions may no longer wear beards. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
I realize that compliance with the Cal/OSHA regulation on 
respiratory protection will be difficult for some of our employees.  
This is one of the reasons that we undertook an extensive review 
of our obligation under the Cal/OSHA regulation . . . .86
Chevron was in contact with Cal/OSHA in regards to Bhatia’s conflict with 
its respiratory safety policy.  In a letter between Art Carter, Chief of 
California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH), and 
R.W. Davis at Chevron, Carter explained that the Division had reviewed 
Chevron’s bulletin, but that there was confusion as to whether the 
 
 
 84. E.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing 
Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1382) (“Such regulations are often justified with regard to safety 
concerns.”). 
 85. E.g., Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1383-84) (“[A]n employer is not liable under Title VII when 
accommodating an employee's religious beliefs would require the employer to violate 
federal or state law. . . . [for] the existence of such a law establishes ‘undue hardship.’”). 
 86. Bulletin from the Mfg. Dep’t of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. to the Employees of Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., Richmond, Cal. (May 10, 1982) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Business Law) (emphasis added). 
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company’s policy was absolutely necessary under Cal/OSHA.87  Chief 
Carter invited Chevron representatives to have a meeting with himself and 
a fellow staff member to discuss the situation.88  While careful not to overly 
assert the Division’s authority over Chevron’s employment policies, Chief 
Carter offered Davis the Division’s assistance in finding an alternative for 
those employees who had “only a remote possibility of encountering an 
emergency situation . . . requiring respiratory protection.”89  The same day, 
Chief Carter responded to Assemblyman Thomas Hannigan about Bhatia’s 
situation, where he explained that Cal/OSHA “[did] not have a regulation 
that routinely requires that every employee who may have some possibility 
of toxic fume exposure be clean shaven so as to get a good respirator fit.”90  
In his letter to Assemblyman Hannigan, before completing his review of 
the situation, Chief Carter was sympathetic towards Bhatia and somewhat 
suspicious of Chevron’s new policy, believing that it was overly expansive 
and unnecessary.91
On August 16, 1982, Chief Carter and an associate, Dr. Alvin 
Greenberg, Special Assistant in charge of the Research and Development 
Unit of Cal/OSHA, met with several Chevron management personnel 
concerning Bhatia’s situation.
 
92  The Chevron representatives explained the 
company’s position that as a machinist, Bhatia needed to be assignable to 
any location in the plant, including those that would require respirators 
because of potential exposure to gases or toxins.93  The following day, 
Chief Carter met with Bhatia and four other Sikhs.94  Bhatia explained to 
Chief Carter that he was routinely assigned to work in the main machine 
shop location, which did not involve responding to any emergency 
situations or performing any routine work that required respirator use.95
 
 87. See Letter from Art Carter, Chief, Cal. Div. of Occupational Safety and Health, to 
R.W. Davis, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (June 17, 1982) (on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law) (suggesting the possibility that Chevron’s policy 
could be “going above and beyond” the state regulations). 
  
 88. See id. (“I feel that a meeting . . . would be most useful.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Letter from Art Carter, Chief, Cal. Div. of Occupational Safety and Health, to 
Thomas M. Hannigan, Cal. Assemblyman (June 17, 1982) (on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law) (emphasis added). 
 91. See id. (“[W]e have reason to believe that the policy of Chevron is much too far 
embracing, and is totally unnecessary, and impractical.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Letter from Art Carter, Chief, Cal. Div. of Occupational Safety and 
Health, to Thomas M. Hannigan, Cal. Assemblyman (Aug. 25, 1982) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law) (describing his meeting with Chevron 
representatives). 
 93. See id. (“It is their contention that . . . . it [is] critical that they have the ability to 
assign machinists at any point in the plant to carry out their responsibilities.”). 
 94. See id. (discussing his meeting with Bhatia). 
 95. See id. (describing Chevron’s plant as being divided into zones, each with its own 
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According to Bhatia, because of the plant’s different zones, each had a 
specially assigned group of machinists to respond in emergency 
situations.96  Consequently, machinists in the main machine room did not 
need to respond to emergencies that required respirators.97
Later that month, Chief Carter sent status report letters to both 
Assemblyman Hannigan and Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. of California, 
as Bhatia had contacted them both with pleas of assistance.
 
98  Chief Carter 
described to the public officials the aforementioned meetings and 
Chevron’s pending offer of a janitorial position to Bhatia.99
I personally believe that Chevron management, for reasons that 
relate more to a desire to keep strict control over management 
prerogatives relating to assignment of employees, is being very 
rigid in not being willing to recognize that Mr. Bhatia has a 
legitimate religious reason for not complying with their 
regulations concerning shaving facial hair.  It does seem to me 
that he could be assigned permanently to the main machine shop, 
in which case he would not be exposed to either routine or 
emergency situations in which the wearing of a respirator 
requiring a close fit is required.
  While the two 
letters were for the most part identical, before his closing to Governor 
Brown, Chief Carter revealed his understanding of the situation after 
meeting with both sides: 
100
While Chief Carter concluded that the company was unreasonably rigid, 
the Ninth Circuit accepted Chevron’s position that it required the ability to 
assign employees randomly at any point in time.
 
101  It is difficult to fathom 
how a court on summary judgment could accept Chevron’s argument that 
its policy was necessary to avoid violating Cal/OSHA regulations, when 
Cal/OSHA did not believe so.102
 
specially assigned group of machinists for emergency work). 
  Despite the absence of any real violation 
of Cal/OSHA, the court hypothesized the creation of one by concluding 
that if Chevron were to retain Bhatia as a machinist and he were exposed to 
toxic gas, Chevron could risk liability of violating Cal/OSHA.  The court 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; Letter from Art Carter, Chief, Cal. Div. of Occupational Safety and Health, to 
Edmund G.  Brown, Jr., Governor of Cal. (Aug. 25, 1982) (on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law) (providing a summary of the events to date). 
 99. See Letter from Art Carter to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., supra note 98, at 2 (indicating 
that Bhatia was still considering the janitor offer). 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). 
 101. Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1384. 
 102. See Letter from Art Carter to Thomas M. Hannigan, supra note 90 (“Clearly we do 
not have a regulation that routinely requires that every employee who may have some 
possibility of toxic fume exposure be clean shaven so as to get a good respirator fit.”). 
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overly emphasized the probability of Bhatia being assigned a position that 
would expose him to toxic gas, thereby requiring his use of a respirator, 
when never in three years had Bhatia once been assigned a position that 
involved even the potential exposure to toxic gas.  Inexplicably, the court 
used this hypothetical situation to wrongfully conclude that the employer’s 
accommodation would have imposed on it an undue hardship, when it has 
been established that “[u]ndue hardship cannot be prove[n] by assumptions 
nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts.”103
A further component of the Ninth Circuit’s finding of undue hardship 
was based on its determination that the company’s need to maintain its 
system of unpredictable task-assigning would have inevitably placed 
Bhatia in a position in which he would be exposed to toxic chemicals.
 
104  
However, the court provided no substantive explanation to support its 
assertion that Chevron had to maintain its system of unpredictable job 
assignments or that modifying its system for Bhatia would have caused an 
undue burden.  Curiously, the court presumed that if Chevron were to 
accommodate Bhatia and not assign him to duties that required a respirator, 
the company would have to “revamp” its entire system of assignments.105
Chief Carter was certainly sympathetic to Bhatia; unfortunately, his 
position at Cal/OSHA did not allow him to grant Bhatia an exemption to 
Chevron’s employment policies.
  
Yet the court could have entertained the possibility of Chevron maintaining 
its unpredictable system of job rotation, and simply excluding Bhatia from 
this system by allowing him to remain in a position that never required the 
use of a respirator. 
106  “If the management of a company 
determines that it is necessary for a worker to wear a respiratory protection 
as part of that company’s safety program . . . it is beyond Cal/OSHA’s 
ability to second guess the need for that type of protection.”107
 
 103. Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979) (emphasis added); see also Sturgill v. United 
Parcel Serv., 512 F.3d 1024, 1033 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Polk County, 61 
F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (“Undue hardship cannot be proved by assumptions 
nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts.”). 
  However, in 
situations like these, where employees are faced with unwarranted policies 
that lead to discrimination, it is not only within the capacity of the courts to 
challenge and overturn discriminatory policies, but their duty to do so 
 104. Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1384. 
 105. See id. at 1384 (“If [Chevron] retained him as a machinist . . . [it] would have to 
revamp its . . . system of duty assignments.”). 
 106. See Letter from Art Carter, Chief, Cal. Div. of Occupational Safety and Health, to 
Richard A. Uhlar, Indus. Hygienist, Int’l Chem. Workers Union (Sept. 28, 1982) (on file 
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law) (expressing Cal/OSHA’s 
difficulty in the situation). 
 107. Id. at 2. 
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under Title VII.  As a member of the Sikh religion, Bhatia’s situation is 
unfortunately a perfect example of Justice Marshall’s expression of concern 
over the unique difficulties and barriers that religious minorities face in the 
workplace.108
Most significant, courts have ignored the negative class implications 
of their decisions in religious discrimination cases.  In reality, Bhatia was 
not only defending his right to employment but those of similarly situated 
Sikh employees and workers belonging to other faiths whose capacity to be 
employed would be eroded by non-job related policies prohibiting the 
wearing of a beard.  It is therefore reasonable to maintain that when an 
employment policy has a disparate impact on an entire class of Sikhs or 
Muslims, the appropriate standard of review should not be the de minimis 
standard, but rather the standard of “business necessity,” first applied in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
 
109
IV. GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER CO. 
 to protect African Americans, and 
subsequently women in the work force from discrimination. 
A. Background 
 In Griggs, African-American employees sued their employer for 
maintaining personnel policies that had the effect of restricting minorities 
into inferior and low wage paying positions.110  At issue were two selection 
criteria.  The first criterion required a high school education for initial job 
assignments and for transfers from the Coal Handling to the “inside” 
departments.111  The second required that all new employees pass 
standardized general intelligence tests as a qualification for employment.112  
The Fourth Circuit held that the employment policies did not violate Title 
VII because there was no proof of a discriminatory purpose.113  Upon 
review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.114  It found that 
these criteria would adversely affect the employment opportunities of racial 
minorities.115
 
 108. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Particularly troublesome 
has been the plight of adherents to minority faiths who do not observe the holy days on 
which most businesses are closed . . . but who need time off for their own days of religious 
observance.”). 
  Specifically, the Court pointed to census data from North 
 109. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 110. Id. at 426. 
 111. Id. at 427. 
 112. Id. at 427-28. 
 113. Id. at 428. 
 114. Id. at 436. 
 115. Id. at 430. 
WOLKINSONFINALIZED_SEVEN_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:47 PM 
2010] REAPPRAISAL OF BHATIA V. CHEVRON  1201 
 
 
Carolina indicating that while thirty-four percent of white males had 
graduated high school, only twelve percent of minorities had graduated.116  
Moreover, EEOC records suggested that while fifty-eight percent of whites 
passed standardized tests, only six percent of African Americans passed.117  
In his decision, Justice Burger declared that “[u]nder the Act, practices, 
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of 
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of 
prior discriminatory employment processes.”118
B. The Business Necessity Standard 
 
In Griggs, the Supreme Court established a business necessity 
standard that would render unlawful employer policies that had a 
disproportionately adverse impact on minorities, unless the employer could 
demonstrate empirically that the job requirement had “a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.”119  Finding that neither the 
completion of high school nor the general intelligence test bore any 
relationship to an employee’s performance at work, the Court declared 
Duke Power’s policies to be unlawful.120
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions affirmed this new approach.  For 
example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, a case alleging sex discrimination 
against women seeking employment in a correctional facility, the Court, 
citing Griggs, reaffirmed this standard:  “Once it is thus shown that the 
employment standards are discriminatory in effect, the employer must meet 
‘the burden of showing that any given requirement [has] . . . a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.’”
 
121
Griggs and its progeny have established a three-part analysis of 
disparate impact claims.  To establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral 
employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact.  
If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that 
‘any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question,’ in order to avoid a finding of 
discrimination.
  In Connecticut v. Teal, the 
Court again applied this standard: 
122
 
 116. Id. at 431 n.6. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 430. 
 119. Id. at 432. 
 120. Id. at 431-32. 
 121. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). 
 122. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
432). 
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When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it expressly endorsed the 
principal that employers cannot justify employment practices on the basis 
of operational objectives that are unrelated to specific job performance.  
Thus, the legislative history to the 1991 amendments indicates that: 
Justifications such as customer preference, morale, corporate 
image, and convenience, while perhaps constituting ‘legitimate’ 
goals of an employer, fall far short of the specific proof required 
under Griggs and this legislation to show that a challenged 
employment practice is closely tied to the requirements of 
performing the job in question and thus is ‘job related for the 
position in question.’123
Had the court applied a business necessity model in Bhatia, it is 
apparent that a different outcome would have occurred.  Within that 
framework, Chevron would have been required to demonstrate that its 
requirement that all machinists wear respirators was job-related.
 
124  This 
burden would have been impossible to sustain since it was undisputed that 
Bhatia worked in a position involving no exposure to toxic gases.125
It is also apparent that had a business necessity standard been applied, 
the court would not have permitted Chevron to use its haphazard system of 
job assignments as a mechanism by which to justify the exclusion of 
workers belonging to particular religious groups.  The Eleventh Circuit 
decision in Hardin v. Stynchcomb is illustrative of this argument.
  
Furthermore, it is most unlikely that the court would consider job-related a 
speculative concern that in an emergency situation Bhatia might need to 
wear a respirator when Cal/OSHA had concluded that there were no safety 
concerns mandating Bhatia’s use of a respirator.  As a result, Chevron’s 
policy, which excluded all Sikhs from employment as machinists, would 
seemingly fail the Griggs standard of business necessity. 
126  
Plaintiff Mary Hardin filed a class action Title VII sex discrimination suit 
after her application for a position as a deputy sheriff was rejected.127  The 
defendant County Sheriff’s Department maintained that the protection of 
the inmates’ privacy rights justified its policy of only assigning male 
deputy sheriffs to work in the male section of the jail.128
The court noted that the effect of the County Sheriff's policy of job 
 
 
 123. 137 CONG. REC. H9528 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
 124. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“If an employment practice . . . cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”). 
 125. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting 
that never in three years had Bhatia ever been required to wear a respirator). 
 126. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (requiring the 
employer to modify its system of job assigning). 
 127. Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1365. 
 128. Id. at 1367. 
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rotation would have inevitably excluded women from all jobs within the 
facility, even those not requiring observation of inmates involved in the 
care of their personal hygiene.129  Considering the potential discriminatory 
impact, the court indicated that the “defendants bear the burden of proving 
that because of the nature of the operation of the business they could not 
rearrange job responsibilities in a way that would eliminate the clash 
between the privacy interests of the inmates and the employment 
opportunities of female deputy sheriffs.”130  Additionally, the court 
indicated that since a majority of jobs in the male section of the jail did not 
require strip searches or observation of inmates’ use of shower or toilet 
facilities, there was no reason why the Sheriff’s Department could not 
modify its system of rotating deputy sheriff assignments.131  As a result, the 
court found the employer’s failure to employ women in the male section of 
the jail to be unlawful.132
In Bhatia, no evidence was presented that the employer could not have 
modified its policy of haphazard or unpredictable job assignments, which 
operated to exclude Bhatia and similarly situated religious minorities from 
employment.  Specifically, the company did not have to assign Bhatia to a 
position that involved exposure to toxic chemicals, when such assignments 
were outside the scope of his normal job responsibilities.  If the Title VII 
protection of business necessity can be used to protect racial and sexual 
minorities from policies of total exclusion, it is inexplicable and 
indefensible that the same protection should not be applied to prevent 
religious minorities from similar discrimination. 
 
C. No-Beard Policies and Their Disparate Impact on Religious 
Minorities 
There have been other judicial rulings involving no-beard policies that 
have similarly led to the arbitrary discrimination of religious minorities.  In 
EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, the EEOC filed a Title VII claim against the 
defendant restaurant for failing to accommodate an employee who refused 
to comply with its no-beard policy because of his religious beliefs.133  
There, Mohan Singh Tucker, a religious Sikh, applied for and was rejected 
for a position as a restaurant manager.134
 
 129. Id. at 1369. 
  The EEOC argued that Tucker 
was unlawfully denied the position because of the restaurant’s application 
 130. Id. at 1370-71. 
 131. Id. at 1373-74. 
 132. Id. at 1374. 
 133. EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 134. Id. at 88. 
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of its grooming policy, which prohibited any facial hair on restaurant 
managerial personnel.135
According to the restaurant, its grooming standards were justified by 
its efforts to promote a favorable public image.
 
136  In addition, Sambo’s 
contended that its standards were based on the public’s preference in 
restaurants for managers and employees who were clean-shaven.137  The 
district court agreed with the employer and held that an exception to the 
defendant’s grooming standards would impose an undue hardship.  
Therefore, the defendant was not obligated to accommodate Mr. Tucker’s 
religious practices.138  Furthermore, the court concluded, that even if this 
were a case of religious discrimination, a clean-shaven appearance was a 
bona fide occupation qualification for a manager in a restaurant that relied 
on family trade.139  However, the employer’s concerns were speculative in 
nature, as no evidence was presented that the restaurant would sustain a 
loss of patronage if a manager were bearded.  Noting the negative impact 
that a decision not to accommodate would have on the capacity of certain 
religious minorities to work in restaurants, the EEOC argued that the court 
should apply a disparate impact approach in the case, which would have 
required the restaurant to demonstrate that not wearing a beard was in fact 
job-related.140  The court refused.141
In rejecting the application of the disparate impact doctrine, the court 
noted that there was no evidence that anyone besides the plaintiff was 
actually adversely affected by the no-beard policy.
 
142
There is no requirement, however, that a statistical showing of 
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the 
characteristics of actual applicants.  The application process 
might itself not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant 
  Yet the Supreme 
Court long ago established in Dothard v. Rawlinson that it is a mistake to 
rely only on applicant flow data to determine adverse impact: 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 89. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 90 (“[D]oing so would adversely affect Sambo’s public image and the 
operation of the affected restaurant or restaurants as a consequence of offending certain 
customers . . . would impose on Sambo’s a risk of noncompliance with sanitation 
regulations . . . and would make more difficult the enforcement of grooming standards as to 
other restaurant employees . . . .”); see also McDaniel v. Essex Int’l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 341 
(6th Cir. 1978) (“[Section] 701(j) requires that a reasonable accommodation be made or a 
showing that to do so would work an undue hardship.”). 
 139. Sambo’s, 530 F. Supp. at 90. 
 140. Id. at 92. 
 141. Id. at 92-93. 
 142. See id. at 93 (“[T]he evidence does not show that the defendants’ grooming 
standards had actual impact on anyone other than Mr. Tucker.”). 
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pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from 
applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very 
standards challenged as being discriminatory.143
In Sambo’s, the court noted that the effect of a no-beard policy “is 
theoretically total, in the sense that all such members are forbidden to 
comply with grooming rules such as those of the defendants . . . .”
 
144
Similarly, in Brown v. F.L. Roberts, the plaintiff was a practicing 
Rastafarian who did not shave or cut his hair because of his religious 
beliefs.
  Given 
this acknowledgment, the court should have recognized that the effect of 
the restaurant’s policy would discourage all Sikhs from applying for any 
job involving customer contact, out of the self-recognition of their inability 
to meet the no-beard grooming policy.  Hence, the no-beard policy not only 
negatively affected the plaintiff, but his co-religionists living in the 
community serviced by the restaurant. 
145  Brown worked intermittently at a Jiffy Lube oil change facility 
from 1999 through May 2002.146  In July 2001, the plaintiff was hired as a 
lube technician, which entailed working in both upper and lower bays of 
the facility.147  Around a month later, the employer’s Jiffy Lube divisions 
acquired a new vice president of operations, Richard C. Smith, who hired a 
consultant to help increase business.148  Based on the consultant’s advice 
and data on the success of businesses that had “clean shaven personal 
appearance policies,” Smith decided to implement a new policy requiring 
all employees who had customer contact to be clean-shaven.149  The 
plaintiff explained to Smith and other assistant managers his religious 
conflict with the new policy, but once the policy went into effect, Brown 
was forced to work exclusively in the lower bay, where there was no 
customer contact.150  According to Brown, the working conditions in the 
lower bay were poorer than those in the upper bay; in particular, he 
asserted that because he was often the only employee working in the lower 
bay, it was difficult for him to take breaks.151  Brown also complained of 
the cold temperature of the lower bay in the winter.152
After reviewing these facts for summary judgment,
 
153
 
 143. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (internal citations omitted). 
 the district court 
 144. Sambo’s, 530 F. Supp. at 93. 
 145. Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 10. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 11. 
 152. See id. (“[I]t was just like working in a basement without any heat.”). 
 153. Both parties moved for summary judgment.  Id. 
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held that:  1) the employee had established a prima facie case of 
discrimination;154 2) the employer offered the plaintiff a reasonable 
accommodation;155 and 3) if required to make any further accommodation, 
the employer would suffer an undue hardship.156
Here too we have a court permitting discrimination against all 
members of religious minorities whose faith requires them to wear a beard.  
The effect of the court's decision was not only that Brown was subjected to 
more onerous working conditions, but also that similarly situated religious 
minorities would be affected at this particular facility.  Interestingly, it is 
difficult to conceptualize a workplace where it would be more difficult for 
an employer to justify a policy prohibiting the wearing of beards.  No 
evidence was presented that any member of the public ever complained 
about Brown or any other co-worker because they wore a beard.  
Moreover, no empirical evidence was presented that at any particular 
garage patronage was reduced because some employees wore beards.  Also 
undermining the legitimacy of the employer’s no-beard policy was that the 
policy was not implemented in all of the employer's facilities.
 
157
V. CONCLUSION 
  Finally, 
the wearing of a beard certainly had no effect on Brown’s ability to 
perform his job duties.  Given these considerations, even within the de 
minimis standard of Title VII, it is difficult to understand why the court did 
not find a duty to accommodate.  Yet, were we to apply the more rigorous 
business necessity standard because of the class-wide negative impact of 
the employer’s policy, the no-beard policy would certainly be viewed as an 
unjustified exclusionary barrier that would have to be removed. 
The proper balancing of bona fide religious practices against an 
employer's policy decisions remains a difficult issue, as these cases 
demonstrate.  “Still, it is a matter of concern when the balance appears to 
 
 154. See id. at 13-14 (“[I]t would be distasteful to suggest that employers can legally 
single out employees who assert inconvenient but bonafide religious beliefs and isolate them 
in unappealing work environments without ‘adversely’ affecting the conditions of their 
employment.”). 
 155. See id. at 15 (transferring the plaintiff to the lower bay allowed the plaintiff to 
continue his employment and receive a pay increase while maintaining his religious 
practice).  But see id. (“[T]he court cannot say with confidence that no reasonable jury could 
find that Defendant, in fact, failed to offer a reasonable accommodation . . . . A ruling that 
the accommodation offered . . . was reasonable as a matter of law would constitute too 
drastic a limitation on the protections offered under Title VII . . . .”). 
 156. See id. at 17 (creating a blanket exemption from the grooming policy for the 
plaintiff would constitute an undue hardship). 
 157. See id. at 10 (“Other divisions at F.L. Roberts did not . . . implement new 
appearance policies.”). 
WOLKINSONFINALIZED_SEVEN_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:47 PM 
2010] REAPPRAISAL OF BHATIA V. CHEVRON  1207 
 
 
tip too strongly in favor of an employer's preferences, or perhaps 
prejudices.”158  An excessive protection of an employer's public image 
conflicts with and obscures the rich diversity of our work force, and may be 
exploited as a mechanism for rejecting workers wearing a beard, yarmulke, 
or veil.  Regrettably, it places individuals whose work habits and 
commitment to their employers may be exemplary in the position of having 
to unnecessarily choose between a job and a deeply held religious 
practice.159
A change in judicial policy is therefore necessary to promote a more 
diverse workforce that is more consistent with the current changes 
occurring within our labor force.  The Supreme Court could redefine the 
statutory term “undue hardship” to better accommodate religious 
minorities.  Yet this outcome is unlikely given the Court’s current 
composition.  Recently the civil rights community was successful in 
persuading Congress to amend both the ADA and Title VII to overturn 
regressive Supreme Court decisions negatively affecting the handicapped 
and women subjected to wage discrimination.
  Furthermore, unsubstantiated concerns over safety may be used 
unfairly to deny equal employment opportunities to workers, like Bhatia, of 
the Sikh, Muslim, or Jewish faiths. 
160  Similar efforts should be 
made to amend Title VII, by enacting legislation similar to the proposed 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2008.161
[T]he practice of wearing religious clothing or a religious 
hairstyle, or of taking time off for a religious reason, imposes an 
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business in 
accommodating such practice only if the accommodation imposes 
a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct of the 
employer's business . . . . 
  Under the proposed 
amendment to Title VII: 
 
The term 'wearing religious clothing or a religious hairstyle' 
means . . . 
 
(D) adopting the presence, absence, or style of a person's hair or 
beard as a religious practice or an expression of religious 
belief.162
By establishing a business necessity standard for religious 
 
 
 158. Id. at 19. 
 159. Id. 
 160. ADA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 22 Stat. 3553 (2008); 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 1, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
 161. Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2008, S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008).  Because 
the bill was introduced in a previous congressional session, no more action can occur to it. 
 162. Id. at § 2(D) (emphasis added). 
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discrimination claims, Congress would secure the proper protection for 
religious employees that was anticipated in the Griggs decision when the 
Supreme Court outlawed “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”163
 
 163. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added). 
  Only by offering 
the same legal protection from discrimination to religious minorities as we 
do to racial and sexual minorities can we establish true equality for all 
groups in our society. 
